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Paternalism versus autonomy – are we barking up the wrong tree? 
 
Summary: We explore whether we can reduce paternalism by increasing 
patient autonomy. We argue that paternalism is about the doctor-patient 
relationship whilst autonomy is an ethical value. This makes it unlikely that 
one can be diminished by prioritising the other without significant ethical 
consequences. We argue that autonomy should not have any automatic 
priority over other ethical values. Thus, balancing autonomy versus other 
ethical pillars and finding the optimal balance between the patient’s wishes 
and those of other relevant stakeholders such as the patient’s family has to be 
dynamic over time. Different countries, different socio-economic contexts and 
different cultures need to develop ways to optimise this re-balancing process 
so that any limitations to patient autonomy are for the shortest possible time 
and in the least restrictive way. 
 
Many attempts have been made across the world to reduce paternalism in 
medicine.  In psychiatry these attempts have arguably been most pronounced 
because psychiatry has traditionally used legislation to sanction coercion and 
detention, thus reducing patient autonomy1. For England and Wales the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 explicitly sanctions the use of coercion in order to 
facilitate investigations and treatment that is in the patient’s best interest 
whilst the patient lacks capacity.  Traditionally the argument has been that 
doctors and nurses have made too many decisions for patients, which has 
compromised patient autonomy and recent court interpretations of the Mental 
Capacity Act have reinforced the importance of patient autonomy2. 
 The question that arises from these developments is primarily whether we will 
actually be able to reduce medical paternalism by increasing patient 
autonomy and whether the legislation route is the best way forward in this 
regard.  Patient autonomy is an ethical value which is important and has 
developed over decades.  There is however no a priori reason to focus on any 
one particular ethical value above others. Beauchamp and Childress first 
defined the four pillars of medical ethics and included beneficience (do good), 
non maleficience (do no harm), autonomy and justice3.  In medical ethics it is 
very clear that patient autonomy should be seen as a value of equal status to 
the others, not prioritised as a value of higher order. Beauchamp and 
Childress point out that society has a legitimate interesting in good outcome 
and “doing good”. Simply put, in medical ethics doing the right thing for the 
patient has equal value to patient autonomy.   
 
Other medical ethics theories such as the ethics of care focus on the 
dilemmas patients have to navigate within complex relationships and 
environments4,5.  They consider care and empathy to be primary objectives of 
medical and nursing input. Again, they particularly recognise the complexity of 
human relationships that people live in and the fact that relatives and friends 
may well play an important role for the patient’s decision making and 
continuous treatment. An example of this different focus is seen in many 
societies in the developing world where more collegial decision making 
processes within the family are preferred, and beneficence for the family as a 
whole may be seen as more important than the immediate autonomy of the 
individual at a particular point in time6. It should be emphasised that any 
overruling of the patient’s autonomy is not necessarily permanent. By a 
temporary overruling of this principle, e.g. in psychotic states, the patient can 
regain capacity to exercise “true” autonomous decisions once recovered. By 
focussing on patient autonomy to the detriment of beneficience, non-
maleficience and justice, we create the potential for services to become unjust 
as a whole and for individual decisions to regularly not turn out to be in the 
patient’s interest.  Some may argue that this is a legitimate price to pay if it 
overcomes paternalism but this implies the fundamental assumption that by 
strengthening patients’ expressed wishes, autonomy will in fact overcome 
medical paternalism.   
 
However, this assumption has a number of serious flaws. Paternalism is a 
description of a particular type of doctor-patient or nurse-patient relationship 
that implies that the doctor or nurse knows what is best for the patient and 
enforces that opinion on the patient7.  The patient in this type of relationship is 
not equal but in a subordinate position. Modern medicine has rightly argued 
that this has to change and that the patient not only has to be in an equal 
position to the doctor but he or she is also the ultimate decision maker. Many 
attempts have been made to facilitate the change in the doctor relationship by 
educating doctors and nurses as well as patients and in the UK the General 
Medical Council has played a major role in this. Other countries have had 
similar drives to alter the balance towards the patient.  Recent court cases 
about consent and autonomy in England and Wales have established the 
principle that even the consent process and the choice of side-effects 
mentioned has to be individualised towards each patient.  The argument used 
by the judges who passed those judgments was always to reinforce autonomy 
in order to overcome paternalistic behaviours by doctors and nurses8.  
 
However the fundamental problem with this approach of using a legalistic 
focus on autonomy to battle paternalism is that paternalism is about the 
doctor-patient relationship whilst autonomy is an ethical value. These 
relationships in healthcare exist in parallel to principles of ethics5.  
Fundamental relationships can and need to change over time if we want to 
improve healthcare and the way we treat patients, but are we barking up the 
wrong tree if we think we will achieve this by compromising fundamental 
ethical values such as beneficience, non-maleficience and justice? Whilst 
there is always a tendency to use legislation when desired developments do 
not happen quickly enough there is little evidence to suggest that this 
approach works to change behaviours. Furthermore by medalling with 
important ethical values we run the serious risk of jeopardising good 
outcomes and justice within the healthcare system. This is because a 
constant rather than a dynamic focus on autonomy is likely to increase the 
number of poor outcomes, especially as clinicians regularly over-estimate 
patients’ capacity to make decisions6,9. In addition it requires additional 
resources to facilitate individual healthcare wishes which may then have an 
impact on the overall ability of the system to deliver just healthcare, especially 
in times of austerity and limited resources. If we create an imbalance between 
fundamental medical ethical values we are likely to jeopardise outcomes 
without addressing the fundamental problems of paternalism. Paternalism can 
only be changed by changes to the doctor-patient relationship which are 
fundamentally about equality and communication and not autonomy7. 
Balancing autonomy versus other ethical pillars and finding the optimal 
balance between the patient’s wishes and those of other relevant 
stakeholders such as the patient’s family has to be dynamic over time, 
depending on the course of the patient’s mental condition. However, a 
reasonable first starting point to finding solutions would be an acceptance that 
the primacy of the immediate expressed wish of autonomy can cause 
potential problems for the patient´s recovery. If we accept that there is no 
prima facie case that any ethical principle should trump any other in all cases, 
re-balancing the different interests and ethical principles in psychiatric practice 
could focus on outcomes that are important for the patient and his or her 
immediate environment. This would have to be done with a clear knowledge 
of important ethical principles other than autonomy and what they mean in 
current practice in different socio-economic contexts10. Different countries, 
different socio-economic contexts and different cultures need to develop ways 
to optimise this re-balancing process so that any limitations to patient 
autonomy are for the shortest possible time and in the least restrictive way. 
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